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STATEMENT OF CASE

A.

Nature of Case
Plaintiff/Appellant Janice K. Freer (hereinafter "Janice") gifted monies on numerous
different occasions to Defendant/Respondent Cody Freer (hereinafter "Cody'') in order
for him to purchase a vehicle for transportation to and from work. At no point was there
ever any such kind of an oral or written agreement between parties for recompense of
the gifted amounts, therefore Cody maintains that no repayment was to be made.
Janice alleges that all monies were to be repaid and that Cody agreed to repay such
amounts.

B.

Proceedings
After trial to the bench, the District court, The Honorable Barbara Buchanan
presiding, found that Janice had indeed intended to make a gift to Cody. The District
court also found that if there ever would have been any type of oral agreement for Cody
to pay Janice back, The agreement would have been unenforceable based on the statute
of frauds, Idaho Code §9-505(1).

C.

Facts
Janice is Cody's aunt. (Tr.8, Ln.4) Janice heard that Cody was incarcerated in Orofino,
Idaho, and started coming to visit Cody once a month or more starting in the fall of
2010. (Tr.8, Ln.12) During these visits Janice made it well known to Cody that she was in
a financially well off state and that she wanted to help Cody get back on his feet upon
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release from prison. Janice further discussed gifting monies to Cody to purchase a
vehicle as well as pay for the first full year of insurance on the vehicle. During these
discussions with Cody, Janice made it very clear that if Cody was not in a position to
repay monies or if Cody did not wish to repay monies that it was not an issue because
more importantly Janice only wished to help out her nephew. At no point did Cody ever
make any direct or indirect acknowledgement that any gifted monies were to be repaid
or that any kind of oral agreement ever existed.
Based on this understanding, Janice went forward with gifting monies to Cody on
eight separate occasions starting on April 4, 2011 and continuing until March 24, 2012
for a total sum of $17,628.36. The first check was written to Cody on April 4, 2011 and
the final wire transfer to Cody was on March 24, 2012-a period of 355 days. During this
time period, Janice wrote a check to Cody, wired him funds on three separate occasions
(including a $14,000.00 wire transfer), and sent him money via money order. Janice also
used her American Express and Visa cards to pay for other expenses related to the truck
including insurance which Janice insisted on paying so Cody had one less thing to worry
about. (Plaintiff exhibit No.21)
Shortly after the final wire transfer from Janice to Cody, Janice mailed a handwritten
·1etter to Cody Asking for Cody to sign the title of his truck over to her. (Tr.37 Ln.1, R.3738) Cody responded by letter stating that he would not be able to comply to Janice's
request and that she should perhaps put some ideas down on paper in the form of a
contract so that Cody and Janice could be on the same page with what was now
expected. Janice refused and this lawsuit ensued.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL

A.

The District Court did not error when finding that Janice did indeed gift monies to
Cody.

B.

The District Court did not error when determining that if any oral agreement did exist
between Janice and Cody it was unenforceable based on the statute of frauds.

C.

There was no partial performance by Cody to support claims of any kind of oral
agreement by Janice.

D.

Janice is not entitled to any attorney's fees incurred by her in this matter.
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ARGUMENT

I.

No substantial competent evidence exists that Janice loaned monies to Cody with any
expectation for recompense because no reasonable person would rely upon Janice's
personal journal entries, court testimony, or blatantly obvious spite and malice as
sufficient evidence to conclude otherwise.
A.

Standard of Review
The district courts finding of fact should not be disturbed on appeal when it is

supported by substantial and competent, non-conflicting, evidence that is clearly not
erroneous. Kennedy v. Schneider, 151 Idaho 440,442,259 P.3d 586,588 (2011).
Evidence is substantial and competent if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and
rely on it.

Although in a feeble attempt Janice filed the original complaint against Cody
while Cody was incarcerated and had no access whatsoever to any legal documentation
or aid, the District Court still found sufficient, non-conflicting, and competent evidence
to conclude that Janice did intend to gift monies to Cody and that no enforceable oral or
written agreement ever existed. Even though Cody was never personally in the presence
of the District Court when he testified in this matter, the court was still able to correctly
and justly evaluate his testimony and confirm the factual findings of the case.

Janice contends that she and Cody had an oral agreement for recompense of
gifted monies and that Cody failed to comply with this agreement. Cody maintains that
no such agreement ever existed and that even if such an agreement ever even did exist
that it is void under Idaho Code §9-505(1). Idaho Code §9-505(1) clearly states that;
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Agreements are to be in writing. In the following case the agreement is invalid, unless
the same or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the
party charged, or by his agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be
received without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents:

1. An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the
making thereof.

B.

It was clearly fair and iust for the District Court to find that Janice did intend to
make a gift to Cody because no sufficient evidence was presented to prove otherwise
and Cody's trial testimony was consistent with his prior statements.
At trial, Janice was unable to provide sufficient evidence to prove that monies
gifted to Cody were anything but just that, a gift. Under Idaho law, a "gift" is defined to

mean '1 a voluntary transfer of property by one to another without consideration or
compensation therefor." Stanger v. Stanger. 98 Idaho 725, 728, 571 P.2d 1126. 1129
(1977). The only evidence provided by Janice to support her claims of the monies being
a loan came from her personal journal entries and letters that she had written to Cody.
The court has the responsibility to weigh both sides of an argument equally and make a
just decision based on competent evidence provided. The court exercised this duty with
precision and integrity when making its decision to file judgment in favor of Cody that all
monies were indeed a gift from Janice. Delivery is accomplished when the grantor

"relinquish[es] all present and future dominion over the property." Boston Ins. Co. v.
Beckett. 91 Idaho 220, 222, 419 P.2d 475, 477 (1966), and Williams. 126 Idaho at 443,

885 P.2d at 1159
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In Zimmerman v. Fawkes, 70 Idaho 389, 219 P.2d 951 (1950), the Idaho Supreme
Court stated the essential elements of a 'gift inter vivos' are: (1) A donor competent to
contract; (2) freedom of will of donor; (3) the gift must be complete and nothing left
undone; (4) the property must be delivered by the donor and accepted by the donee;
(5) the gift must go into absolute and immediate effect. The Idaho Supreme Court went
on to say in Banner life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117,
206 P.3d 481 (2009), that under Idaho law a 'gift' is defined to mean "a voluntary

transfer of property or money by one to another without consideration or
compensation therefor." And that "donative intent may be proven by direct evidence,
including statements of donative intent, or inferences drawn from the surrounding
circumstances, such as the relationship between donor and donee." 126, 206 P.3d 481,
490 (2009).

In this case Janice voluntarily sent a sum of $17,628.36 to Cody over a period of
355 days without any consideration or compensation from Cody, as she herself stated in
her June 10, 2012, letter to Cody. See plaintiffs Exhibit No. 20, at 3, supra. Over that one
year period, Janice continued to send money directly to Cody, or as she alleges, make
truck inspection and insurance payments on Cody's behalf, without receiving any
payment or express written acknowledgement of any debt from Cody. Once again,
Idaho Code §9-505(1) clearly states that; Agreements are to be in writing. In the

following case the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his
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agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing
or secondary evidence of its contents. The law is very clear and concise with this point.

From the date that this lawsuit was filed on February 11, 2013 until the date it
went to trial on November 8, 2013, Cody was incarcerated in Bonner County Jail,
Sandpoint Idaho, Kootenai County Jail, Coeur D' Alene Idaho, Nez Perce County Jail,
Lewiston Idaho, Clearwater County Jail, Orofino Idaho, Idaho State Correctional
Institution, Boise Idaho, Ada County Jail, Boise Idaho, and finally Federal Correctional
Institution Sheridan, Sheridan Oregon. During this time Cody had absolutely no access
to any sort of legal resource or any of the personal letters or emails written to him by
Janice where she directly states that she was intending to make a monetary gift to Cody.
Not only was there no access to a legal library regarding civil law for Idaho, but during all
listed transports, Cody was not allowed to bring along any paperwork with him to the
next housing facility. Janice argues that during the time between when the complaint
was filed until trial that Cody could have easily obtained this evidence, however being
incarcerated in county jails, state prison, and federal prison, such a thing is literally
impossible.

Janice filed into evidence an email from Cody to Janice, dated March 17, 2011 in
which Cody wrote: ... I do want to emphasize that I hope you know your generosity and
kindness is most definatly [sic] appreciated! 11 never did get the impression from you
that this was something that was not to be paid back. I've assumed that it would be that
whole time, so no worries there, we are on the same page. As far as price goes I
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definatly [sic] understand that too. I was only looking at rigs in the ten thousand range
but started drifting a bit after seeing some really nice ones that caught my eye ... "

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2. This letter is not only inapplicable but insufficient evidence of an
alleged loan from Janice to Cody. The email was only referring to Janice's potential
purchase of a vehicle for Cody. In the letter Cody does not expressly acknowledge any
specific debt, nor could he because no vehicle had even been purchased yet and Janice
had not yet sent Cody any monies either.

Janice also submitted several journal entries in which she wrote that Cody "will
pay back out of 1st paycheck" (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3, dated 4/4/11) and "will pay back
when he gets a job" (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5 dated 4/5/11) and "says he will pay back
everything" (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 10 dated 11/9/11) and "no worries will pay back"

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14 dated 1/9/12). These journal entries are insufficient evidence
of any type of loan because despite the one sided journal entries, Cody in fact never
made any payments to Janice over the 355 day time period yet Janice continued to send
Cody money. The clear inferences that can be drawn from Janice continuing to send
Cody money without any recompense, as well as the familial relationship between
Janice and Cody are more than sufficient evidence to establish Janice's donative intent
and the fact that this was indeed a gift.

Throughout the entire process Cody never once expressly acknowledged that
any monies sent to him by Janice was a loan or that any of it was to be repaid. Janice
wrote a personal letter to Cody on October 24, 2012 requesting that Cody sign over the
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title of his truck to Janice because she claims that the vehicle did not have insurance on
it and that Cody had not sent Janice any payment for the money that she had sent him.
On November 3, 2012 Cody responded with a personal letter to Janice (Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 22).

I spoke with my attorney about this matter, ju~t for an opinion, not in
regards to legalities FYI. She advised me that not only in my release dependent
on having reliable insured transportation, but it is also accounted for in my P.S.R.
My current and previous financial background is thoroughly investigated and any
large transactions over a certain dollar amount can have possible negative
connotations from the P.S.R. officer in regards to my sentencing
recommendation. All relevant conduct is accounted for and scrutinized. With
transportation and a job, both of which I have waiting for me, my attorney is
confident that she will be able to get me released this month ... l am not going to
stay locked up longer because I don't have my truck. I realize that you might be
upset with me because of not being in the position to send you any money while
I was out and also because of the scratch on the passenger side. Believe me
when I say that both are equally if not more depressing to me as well! I don't like
being in debt to anyone.
Then later in the same letter from Cody to Janice.
The sooner I am out and working the sooner I can and will be sending you
monthly payments. Perhaps we should put some ideas to paper in regards to a
contract. That way we have a more 'in stone' understanding as to what is
expected, opposed to our own understanding.
This letter is not sufficient evidence to show that monies sent to Cody by Janice
were anything more that gifts. In it Cody states that he doesn't like to be in debt to
anyone but he does not directly express being in any kind of debt to Janice. Cody does
at one point say that the sooner he is out the sooner he can be sending payments to
Janice, but he does not directly confirm what these payments would be for or how much
he would be intending to pay. Furthermore, Cody offers to put together a written
contract with Janice so that there is a more 'in stone' understanding of what is
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expected. Janice clearly rejected this idea by filing lawsuit and that would have been her
opportunity to have clear and substantiated evidence of an alleged loan which would
require repayment. Under Idaho law 'If there be no express promise, but a promise is to
be raised by implication of law, from the acknowledgement of the party, such

acknowledgement ought to contain an unqualified and direct admission of a present
subsisting debt, which the party is liable and willing to pay..•' Mahas v. Kasiska, 47
Idaho 179,186,276 P.315, 317 (1928) (citation omitted).

Janice's behavior has been inconsistent throughout this entire process. Whereas
at first she was more than willing to help Cody without any express consent of
repayment and with no acknowledgement of there being any form of a debt, she later
developed givers remorse and rashly decided to file lawsuit against her nephew Cody
while he was incarcerated and had no way to properly or justly defend or represent
himself. The District Courts decision to rule in Cody's favor is clearly a fine example of
correct, just and fair execution of the Courts responsibility.

II.

If an oral agreement existed it would fall under the statute of frauds because of there
not being any written acknowledgement of a debt and due to the fact that it could not
have been performed within one year.
At trial Janice argued that the alleged oral agreement in this case does not fall
under the Statute of Frauds because she claims that it could have been performed
within one year. At the hearing, Janice's counsel asserted that because the final transfer
of monies occurred 355 days into the year time period, Cody had ten days (i.e. the 365
day) to repay all alleged loans. Janice's attorney opined that Cody could have won the
lottery or borrowed money from someone else to repay alleged loans, and therefore,
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his full performance within one year was not impossible, thus making the Statute of
Frauds in applicable. Not only would a reasonable person not rely on this outrageous
claim as sufficient evidence to rule in Janice's favor, but Idaho's Statute of Frauds also
states:

Idaho's Statute of Frauds provision is found in Idaho Code §9-505.
Section 9-505 provides that "an agreement that by its terms is not to be
performed within a year from the making thereof' is invalid, unless the same
or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the
party charged, or by his agent. I.e.§ 9-505. Evidence of such agreement cannot
be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents. Id.
According to the restatement (Second) of Contracts, courts construe this statute
narrowly. Restatement (Second) of contracts§ 130, cmt. A (1981). Under the
prevailing interpretation, the enforceability of a contract under the one year
provision does not turn on the actual course of subsequent events, nor on the
expectations of the parties as to the probabilities. Id. Contracts of uncertain
duration are simply excluded, and the provision only covers those contracts
whose performance cannot possibly be completed within one year. Id.
Leading treatises follow this general rule. It is well settled that the oral
contracts invalidated by the Statute because they are not to be performed within
a year include only those which cannot be performed within that time period.~
Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 24:3 (West 1999). A
promise which is not likely to be performed within a year, and which is in fact
not performed within a year, is not within the Statute, if at the time the
contract is made there is a possibility in law and in fact that full performance
such as the parties intended may not be completed before the expiration of
the year. Id. The question is not what the probable, or expected, or actual,
performance of the contract was, but whether the contract, according to the
reasonable interpretation of its terms, required that it could not be performed
within the year time period. Id. Further a promise which is performable at or
until the happening of any specified contingency which may or may not occur
within one year is not within the Statute.
Idaho cases are in accord. A contract which is capable of being performed
and might have been fully performed and terminated within a year does not fall
within the statute. Darkne/1 v. Coeur d'Alene & St. Joe Transp. Co., 18 Idaho 61,
69 108 P.536, 539 (1910) (contract was to be terminated on sale of plaintiff's
stock in the corp., which sale might have taken place the following day or any
day during the year). Where the termination of a contract is dependent upon the
happening of a contingency which may occur within a year, although it may not
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happen until the expiration of a year, the contract is not within the Statute, since
it may be performed within a year. Where contract does not contain a definite

term of duration, and was subject to several contingencies which could have
occurred within one year, the Statute of Frauds did not bar enforcement of the
contract. Gen. Auto Parts Co. Inc. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 857, 979

P.2d 1207, 1215 (1999).
In this case, the alleged oral agreement, as pied in complaint, was that: "Each of
the said loans was made verbally with the understanding that it would be repaid in a
timely manner commencing as soon as Cody secured employment. The total of all loans
made by Janice to Cody was $17,628.36." Therefore, the alleged oral loan agreement
was subject to the contingency of Cody obtaining employment. Because Janice pied in
her Complaint and offered proof at trial that her understanding of the alleged oral
agreement was that the loans would be repaid when Cody obtained employment, she
cannot now, after the judgment, attempt to alter the terms of the agreement to remove
the contingency of employment and claim that alleged loans could have been repaid by
lottery winnings, other loans, or some other unknown means.

Janice's final wire transfer was on Saturday March 24, 2012, which was 355 days
after she wrote the first check to Cody on April 4, 2011. Therefore to fall outside the
statute of frauds, there must be a possibility in law and fact that full performance such
as the parties intended (which is repayment of the entire $17,628.36 to Janice} could be
completed before the expiration of one year on Tuesday April 3, 2012, upon the
happening of the specified contingency of Cody obtaining gainful employment. Based on
these facts, it is not reasonable interpretation of the alleged oral contract's terms to
believe that Cody was required to fully perform the contract by both securing gainful
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employment and repaying the entire sum of $17,628.36 in the seven business days
between Sunday March 25, 2012 and Tuesday April 3, 2012. Such an expectation is not
only outrageous but duly unjust as well. The District Court ruled properly on this case by
concluding that there was no enforceable contract oral or otherwise between Janice
and Cody and also by concluding that simply by accepting Janice's monetary gift is not
sufficient compelling evidence to suggest that there was partial performance by Cody.

Idaho supreme court under Idaho Code §9-505 specifically states that an alleged
agreement to guaranty the debt of one to another "is invalid, unless the same or some
note of memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by
his agent. "Failure to comply with the statute of frauds renders any oral agreement

unenforceable both in an action at law for damages and in a suit in equity for specific
performance." Even if there were sufficient facts to prove the oral agreement and it
was proved, it is still unenforceable if there is not a sufficient writing to comply with
the statute of frauds. "In order to render an oral contract falling within the scope of
the statute of frauds enforceable by action, the memorandum thereof must state the
contract with such certainty that its essentials can be known from the memorandum
itself, or by a reference contained in it to some other writing, without recourse to
parol proof to supply them, otherwise it cannot be enforced at law or in equity.
Hoffman v. S V Co. Inc., 102 Idaho 187, 189, 628 P.2d 218, 220 (1980).

Ill.

Janice is not entitled to attorney's fees on Appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §12-
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Idaho Code §12-120{1) provides for an award of attorney's fees where the
amount pleaded is $35,000.00 or less. For the statute to apply, the amount plead must
specifically state that it is below the statutory minimum. In Janice's appellants brief she
claims that the amount plead for attorney's fees is $17,628.36 which is also the exact
same amount of money plead for in the complaint for monies allegedly loaned. So the
grand total plead for in this case is $35,256.72 which clearly exceeds the statutory
minimum.

In addition for the statute to apply, Janice was required to provide Cody notice
of the claim at least ten days prior to filing it. ''The obvious purpose of I.C. §12-120(1) is
to discourage litigation, since the statute requires the defendant to be notified of the
plaintiff's claim against defendant for at least ten days before a complaint can even be
filed.n Cox v. Mueller. 125 Idaho 734,737,874 P.2d 545,548 (1994).

On Wednesday October 24, 2012, Janice requested that Cody sign over the title
of his truck so that Janice could sell it for profit to herself.

" .. .I will need you to sign off on the title to the truck. I will need to sell it.
I am so very sorry to have to write this. I saw the truck yesterday and I
was quite surprised to see the scratches and the damage. It was my
understanding the truck was insured. For sure I know until the end of
April. So, I don't know why you didn't file a claim and get it fixed ...l would
ask that you have either your Mom or Dad bring it (the title) up to you
and sign off...Then if you would just have them hang on to it until I can
get the truck. Again I am so very sorry about this. Perhaps I may be in the
position to help you again when you are released. (R.37-38)

As Janice stated in her letter to Cody she wanted to sell the vehicle for personal
gain due to the fact that she developed givers remorse and was now regretting the
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position she willing put herself in. Janice re-affirms this inference by clearly stating that
"Perhaps I may be in the position to help you again in the future." It is blatantly obvious
that Janice intended to gift these monies instead of loan them as she now alleges.
Furthermore, this letter from Janice is not sufficient notification of an ensuing lawsuit
should Cody not simply sign over his vehicle to her. I.C. §12-120(1) clearly states that for
the statute to apply Cody would have had to have at least ten days' notice of an ensuing
lawsuit in order for Janice to be entitled to any recompense for her decision to file
claim. Due to this not being sufficient or compelling evidence of a proper notice, Janice
is not entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. §12-120(1).

II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
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Conclusion

Janice Freer in an attempt to be a gracious and loving aunt to Cody Freer, gifted
him monies following his release from prison in 2011. At no point was there ever any
acknowledgement by Cody that any of the monies were to be repaid and no sufficient
evidence was ever presented in this case to show express intent to repay any of said
gifts. It is not reasonable for Janice to now, out of a sense of givers remorse, claim that
all gifts were in fact loans. The District Court clearly made a fair and just decision in
concluding that these monies were in fact gifts.

Janice any Cody never had an oral or written agreement for repayment of any
monies that Janice gifted to Cody. Even if there was to have been an agreement it would
be null and void under the Idaho Statute of Frauds and therefore unenforceable. Janice
has failed to provide sufficient and compelling evidence to support her allegations that
there was to be repayment of monies gifted to Cody. It would not only be unjust but
also inequitable for Janice to now receive judgment in her favor when this is clearly a
cut and dry case of spite and malice.

th

DATED this 24 day of October, 2014.

Respondent/Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 24 th day of October, 2014, a true and correct copy of
the following RESPONDENT'S BRIEF was served to the following addressed individuals
listed below, by the method listed below.

Arthur Bistline
Bistline Law, PLLC
1423 N, Government Way
Coeur D' Alene, ID 83814

~gularMail
[ ]Certified Mail
[ )Overnight Mail
[ ]Facsimile
[ ]Interoffice Mail
[ )Hand delivered

Idaho Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101
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